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Introduction
On July 6, 2016, Philando Castile was killed by a police officer in
St. Paul, Minnesota during a traffic stop for a broken tail light.2 Once
pulled over, Castile told the officer that he had a firearm on him.3 The
officer asked him not to reach for it, and Castile said he was not.
Nevertheless, the officer shot Castile. Castile’s girlfriend, Diamond
Reynolds, immediately began streaming the aftermath on Facebook.4
As Castile slumped in his seat, his shirt soaked in blood, Reynolds
stated, “You shot four bullets into him, sir. He was just getting his
license and registration, sir.”5 The officer later claimed that he “feared
for his life.”6 The city settled a lawsuit filed against it by Castile’s

2.

Camila Domonoske & Bill Chappell, Minnesota Gov. Calls Traffic Stop
Shooting ‘Absolutely Appalling at All Levels’, NPR (Jul. 7, 2016, 7:19 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/07/485066807/policestop-ends-in-black-mans-death-aftermath-is-livestreamed-online-video [https:
//perma.cc/P7MA-RCHY].

3.

Dash Camera Shows Moment Philando Castile Is Shot, N.Y. Times (Jun.
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000005176538/dashcamera-shows-moment-philando-castile-is-killed.html [https://perma.cc/3M
QN-4W8B].

4.

Id.

5.

Philando Castile Death: Aftermath of Police Shooting Streamed Live,
BBC (Jul. 7, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-367
32908 [https://perma.cc/S6FL-FS24].

6.

Mark Berman, What the Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Said
About the Shooting, Wash. Post (Jun. 21, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/21/what-the-police-officer-whoshot-philando-castile-said-about-the-shooting/?utm_term=.ab2f31f30319
[https://perma.cc/7T4B-Y5PY].
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family 10 days after a jury acquitted the officer of all charges in the
shooting.7
On March 13, 2009, Jamie Lockard was pulled over for traffic
violations in Lawrenceburg, Indiana, and the officer, upon talking to
Lockard, believed Lockard was intoxicated.8 Lockard registered a
blood alcohol concentration of 0.07% and refused to submit to a
chemical test.9 The officer obtained a search warrant to gather a blood
and urine sample from Lockard.10 The blood sample was obtained
without any problem, but Lockard was unable to provide a urine sample because he “didn’t have to go right then.”11 At this point,
someone—either the officers or a doctor, but it is unclear who—
ordered a catheterization.12 The officers handcuffed Lockard to a bed
and grabbed his ankles while the nurse pulled down his pants, despite
Lockard’s telling the nurse he did not want to be catheterized.13
Lockard said it “felt like something twisting where it ain’t supposed
to be twisting.”14
Lockard sued the officers for violating his Fourth Amendment
rights, but the district court ruled that the officers were entitled to
qualified immunity.15 After an extensive review of the case law surrounding the Fourth Amendment and forced catheterization, the
court concluded that “the existence and/or direction of any discernable trend in the law concerning forcible catheterizations is far from

7.

Mitch Smith, Philando Castile Family Reaches $3 Million Settlement,
N.Y. Times (Jun. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/
philando-castile-family-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/59LA-6SRN];
Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile,
N.Y. Times (Jun. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/
police-shooting-trial-philando-castile.html [https://perma.cc/GH4Y-TKF
G]. Qualified immunity most likely would not have been a factor in this
lawsuit since it was against the city, and not the officer.

8.

Lockard v. City of Lawrenceburg, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1036–37 (S.D.
Ind. 2011).

9.

Id. at 1037.

10.

Id.

11.

Id. at 1037–38.

12.

Id. at 1038.

13.

Id.

14.

Ken Armstrong, When the Cops Take Your Urine by Force, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Oct. 3, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2016/10/03/when-the-cops-take-your-urine-by-force#.F4jCD6LPO [https://
perma.cc/N6JG-N7VR].

15.

Lockard, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.
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clear.”16 Therefore, the court could not hold the officers liable for their
“bad guesses” in a “gray area.”17
Qualified immunity presents a seemingly insurmountable obstacle
for plaintiffs like Lockard and Philando Castile’s family if and when
they decide to sue individual officers.18 When plaintiffs sue government officials for violating their constitutional rights, the government
officials can assert that they are qualifiedly immune from the suit.
This immunity, according to the Supreme Court, protects
“government officials performing discretionary functions . . . insofar as
their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established’ statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”19 The Harlow v. Fitzgerald20 Court—which created the
modern qualified immunity doctrine—hoped these words would create
a balance between public and governmental interests,21 but, as currently applied, qualified immunity tips too far in favor of the
government. This is especially true in Fourth Amendment cases,
where the standards are already deferential to government officials.
The combination of qualified immunity and Fourth Amendment
standards has made it extraordinarily difficult for plaintiffs to argue
the merits.
This is partly by design. One of the main objectives of the current
qualified-immunity regime is preventing too many cases from proceeding to the merits.22 However, the pursuit of this goal has gone too
far. The Supreme Court, under the current standard, has heard 28
qualified immunity cases.23 Of those 28 cases, Fourth Amendment
claims pervaded 21 of them.24 Of those 21, the Court found immunity
in all but three.25 The Court certainly has legitimate interests in
16.

Id.

17.

Id.

18.

No suit has yet been filed for Philando Castile. However, the judge in
Michael Brown’s case has not yet ruled on any qualified-immunity issue,
but has stated that qualified-immunity issues may appear in the summaryjudgment portion of the case. Brown v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15CV00831
ERW (E.D. Mo. July 16, 2015) (order partially dismissing claims).

19.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

20.

457 U.S. 800 (1982).

21.

Id. at 819.

22.

See infra notes 68–78 and accompanying text.

23.

William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 Cal. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 45) available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2896508).

24.

Id.

25.

Id.
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qualified immunity, but the strength the Court has given the doctrine
presents too great an obstacle for plaintiffs who potentially have
meritorious claims. Too many cases are being denied their day in
court.
The Harlow standard, therefore, needs rebalancing. This Note
argues that in order to strike the appropriate balance the Supreme
Court attempted to find in Harlow, qualified immunity for Fourth
Amendment claims should be determined through a case-by-case
balancing test. Before beginning the analysis, a judge would assume
there is a constitutional violation and then weigh an objectivereasonableness factor, a subjective-standard factor, and, finally, a
constitutional-development factor, which will encourage judges to
determine the potential benefits to constitutional development if the
case goes to trial.
Part I traces the development of qualified immunity both
generally and in the context of the Fourth Amendment. Part II
discusses various critiques of qualified immunity. Part III presents the
proposed alternative to qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Part IV presents and compares several other proposed
alternatives to the balancing test.

I. The Development of Qualified Immunity
This Section focuses on the development of the current qualifiedimmunity doctrine and how its evolution was motivated by certain
themes and interests repeated by the Supreme Court. The first
Subsection lays out the current iteration of the doctrine. The
subsequent Subsections focus on the development of qualified immunity, with particular attention to cases that represented shifts in the
doctrine. The final Subsection traces the development of qualified
immunity in the context of the Fourth Amendment.
A.

Qualified Immunity: What Is It?

Qualified immunity is a type of immunity government officials
can assert when being sued for violating constitutional rights.26 It is
an immunity from suit, not just an immunity from paying damages.27
The immunity is qualified—as opposed to absolute—because it applies
26.

It also applies to statutory rights. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982) (“We therefore hold that government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
Since this Note focuses on the Fourth Amendment, the discussion will be
limited to constitutional rights.

27.

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
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unless: (1) the official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and
(2) the right the official violated was clearly established.28 Those
conditions may be addressed in either order.29 The court has labeled
these conditions as the constitutional question and the qualifiedimmunity question, respectively.30 The clearly established right cannot
be defined “at a high level of generality,” meaning, for example, that
the right cannot simply be the language of the Fourth Amendment.31
Furthermore, the right is clearly established if “[t]he contours of the
right [are] sufficiently clear [so] that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”32 The doctrine
aims to “give[] government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.”33 The
qualified-immunity question, therefore, is an objective analysis, asking
how a reasonable government official would act.34
B.

Before Harlow

Before Harlow, the Supreme Court defined qualified immunity as
a good-faith immunity that had both an objective and subjective
element.35 The pre-Harlow objective prong is similar to the qualifiedimmunity question established by Harlow. The Supreme Court used
such phrases as “reasonably appeared at the time,”36 “reasonable
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances,”37 and “clearly established constitutional rule.”38 These
phrases represent one of the cores of qualified immunity: if a reasonable government official would have believed they were not violating

28.

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

29.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

30.

See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (“Deciding the
constitutional question before addressing the qualified immunity question
also promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the
benefit of both the officers and the general public.”).

31.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742.

32.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

33.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743.

34.

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 636–37.

35.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815; Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980); Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).

36.

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).

37.

Wood, 420 U.S. at 318 (quoting Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48).

38.

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
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the Constitution, then that official deserves immunity.39 In addition to
this objective standard, courts gave equal weight to the official’s
“good-faith belief” that what they were doing did not violate the
Constitution.40 The Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the
importance of this subjective analysis, stating that “the official
himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing
right.”41
The Court viewed these questions as two sides of the same
immunity coin. Neither question was more important than the other.42
It would make no sense for an official to knowingly and willfully
disregard someone’s constitutional rights yet be immune, and it would
make no sense for an official to be immune when any other official
would have known their actions were not constitutional.43 Both objective good faith and subjective good faith must be present.44
One important pre-Harlow case developing this standard is
Scheuer v. Rhodes.45 Scheuer specifically sheds light on the reasoning
and interests behind this analysis, and qualified immunity in general.
In Scheuer, the Court heard an appeal from the dismissal of a claim
by the families of three students who died during the Kent State
shootings.46 The families sued the Governor of Ohio and several
officers involved in the shooting.47 The Court had to decide what kind
of immunity applied to each government official.48 Scheuer outlined
two historical reasons for recognizing some kind of immunity for
government officials: the injustice in holding an official liable for exercising official discretion, and the need to prevent officers from feeling
deterred from performing their duties with the firmness needed for the
public good.49 The opinion placed particular emphasis on the latter
interest, stating that “the public interest requires decisions and action
to enforce laws for the protection of the public.”50 Simultaneously, the
39.

Id. at 484.

40.

Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48.

41.

Wood, 420 U.S. at 321.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48.

45.

416 U.S. 232 (1974); John C. Williams, Note, Qualifying Qualified
Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1299 (2012).

46.

Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 234.

47.

Id.

48.

Id. at 242.

49.

Id. at 239–40.

50.

Id. at 241.
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Court recognized that this interest was not strong enough to provide
officers complete immunity from suit.51 Therefore, the Court weighed
the interests between the need to redress constitutional wrongs and
the need to protect officials performing discretionary functions.
The Court did not directly address the exact parameters of
immunity for higher executive officials such as the Governor, but it
did lay out the parameters for qualified immunity for police officers,
which is the subjective and objective standard discussed above.52 In
creating this standard, the Court emphasized that police officers’
conduct should be evaluated based on probable cause and good faith.53
The probable-cause factor lives in the objective prong and the goodfaith factor lives in the subjective standard.54
There are several important takeaways from the Court’s earliest
qualified immunity analyses: (1) the Court saw both the subjective
and objective analysis as intertwined; (2) the defendant had to be
within both the subjective and objective standards to obtain
immunity;55 (3) the Court’s analysis was based on the intricacies of
police work; and (4) the Court emphasized that constitutional wrongs
should be redressed.56
C.

Harlow and the Elimination of Subjectivity

Harlow announced the qualified-immunity standard still in force
today. The Supreme Court has clarified the standard since the
decision, but it has not deviated from the balance struck by Harlow.
In Harlow, a former Air Force official sued two senior White
House aides for a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights.57 He
claimed that the aides had fired him due to his plan to “‘blow the
whistle’ on some ‘shoddy purchasing practices.’”58 Before addressing
the scope of qualified immunity, the Court first held that these aides
enjoyed only qualified immunity instead of an absolute executive
51.

Id. at 247–48.

52.

Id.

53.

Id. at 245; Williams, supra note 45, at 1300.

54.

The Court went on to remand the case to the lower court, as it could not
make a decision on the factual record before it. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 249.
This implies that the lower courts “must find at least some facts before
dismissing the suit upon [the] basis [of qualified immunity].” Williams,
supra note 45, at 1301.

55.

Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).

56.

Williams, supra note 45, at 1303.

57.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802 (1982). The official did not allege
any violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

58.

Id. at 804.
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immunity.59 The Court emphasized that qualified immunity for officials “balance[s] competing values” of affording a damages remedy
for constitutional violations against protecting officials who must use
their discretion to perform official duties.60
The Court then announced that qualified immunity would no
longer be the two-part subjective and objective analysis outlined in
Scheuer; qualified immunity would be limited to Scheuer’s objective
prong.61 Qualified immunity would only protect “government officials
performing discretionary functions . . . [when] their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”62 The Court gave the following
reasons for rejecting the subjective standard.
First, the subjective standard caused procedural problems.63
Qualified immunity is raised before trial, when judges make decisions
based on law, not fact.64 However, good faith is typically a fact
question that should be resolved by a jury. Therefore, qualified immunity pre-Harlow asked courts to engage in an analysis that was
properly left for the jury.65 Furthermore, because of the procedural
posture, a plaintiff could easily survive a qualified-immunity defense
by alleging malice and finding enough facts in the defendant’s history
to suggest such malice.66
These procedural issues created a second issue: it did not permit
“insubstantial lawsuits to be quickly terminated.”67 One of the main
motivators behind qualified immunity according to the Court is the
ability to dispose of “insubstantial claims” before they go to trial.68
The need to dispose of these claims is important because of the
third—and most significant—issue created by the subjective analysis:
59.

Id. at 808–09.

60.

Id. at 807.

61.

Id. at 817–18.

62.

Id. at 818.

63.

John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 851, 852 (2010); Williams, supra note 45, at 1303.

64.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 56.

65.

See Williams, supra note 45, at 1303 (“As the Court saw it, the question
of an official’s intent is one of fact; because questions of fact require a jury
verdict, consideration of intent must await completion of the summary
judgment phase.”).

66.

Jeffries, supra note 63, at 852.

67.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (internal quotations
omitted).

68.

Id. at 815–16, 818.
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increased costs to the parties.69 The Court stated that the defendants
bore the typical costs from the lawsuit, including: distraction from
duties, stifling discretion, and deterring potential officers who would
otherwise want to serve.70 But subjectivity had “special costs.”71 Factfinding for subjectivity in discretionary acts has “no clear end.”72
Parties would have to engage in broad discovery that would be
especially “disruptive of effective government.”73 While these costs
may seem to rest only on the defendant, the Court specifically noted
that these costs are to “society as a whole.”74
The Court decided that a purely objective standard would avoid
these issues. Objectivity based on clearly established law is much
easier to administer than a subjective standard, thus eliminating the
procedural issues in the subjective analysis.75 Determining whether law
is clearly established is well within the competence of a judge at summary judgment.76 The Court hoped the standard would enable lower
courts to dismiss “insubstantial claims,” which would lead to less
disruption of government77 and fewer costs to society. By changing the
procedure to lessen the burdens of discovery and trial on government
officials, the Court changed the substance of the law and its effects on
society.78
The Court also thought the objective standard would protect officials better than an objective and subjective standard. The Court
outlined how this new standard would function:
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal
developments, nor could he fairly be said to “know” that the
law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until

69.

Id. at 817–18; Williams, supra note 45, at 1303; Alan K. Chen, The
Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 275–76 (1995).

70.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.

71.

Id.

72.

Id. at 816–17.

73.

Id. at 817.

74.

Id. at 814; Chen, supra note 69, at 276.

75.

Jeffries, supra note 63, at 852.

76.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.

77.

Id.

78.

John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L.
REV. 207, 251 (2013).
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this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should
not be allowed.79

This standard would better protect officials exercising their discretion
because the current standard is a direct function of how an official
would use their discretion: take the law as they know it and make a
decision.80 Furthermore, the new standard would protect against overdeterrence of official conduct.81 Early in the opinion, the Court emphasized the need to protect officials exercising their discretion.82 This
purely objective standard would give officials a wide range of discretion, so they would not have to fear repercussions for every single
action they take.83
The Court also believed that this new standard still honored the
public interests in qualified immunity.84 The Court stated that an
official who should know the law ought to hesitate, and any injury
from not hesitating could be actionable.85 This goes directly to the
public interest in obtaining money damages for constitutional
wrongs.86 This also deters officials from committing constitutional
torts in the future,87 which is obviously in the interest of the public.
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that preventing over-deterrence is
also a public interest. The Court briefly stated that the public interest
“may be better served by action taken with independence and without
fear of consequences.”88 Therefore, over-deterrence should weigh in
both the public’s and the government’s favor.89 The Court has stood
by these assertions and has vehemently emphasized the importance of
qualified immunity to the public by reversing lower courts’ denials of

79.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.

80.

Id.

81.

Chen, supra note 69, at 264.

82.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.

83.

See id. at 819 (explaining how an objective test protects the public
interest).

84.

Id.

85.

Id.

86.

See id. at 807 (discussing the interests balanced by qualified immunity).

87.

Chen, supra note 69, at 263.

88.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).

89.

Aside from cost-saving and procedural fixes, the Court did not explain: 1)
the drawbacks of including a subjective analysis, or 2) how a subjective
analysis fails to aid interests in damages for constitutional remedies and
protect officials who exercise their discretion. See id. at 814, 816, 818–19.
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qualified immunity.90 In fact, the Court believes that qualified immunity is important enough to the public that it feels the need to “often
correct[] lower courts.”91
Harlow left several questions open about how qualified immunity
functions. One of the first questions was what right must be clearly
established? Using the text of the Constitution itself creates a broad
clearly established right that is easy to violate: any action that violates the Constitution is clearly established.92 This does not protect
discretion in the way envisioned by Harlow, and there would be no
balance in the Harlow interests.93 Therefore, the Court announced
that “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear [so] that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right.”94 The Court has reinforced this notion repeatedly, admonishing lower courts “not to define clearly established law at a high
level of generality.”95 This insures Harlow’s objective of giving officials
“breathing room.”96
Another question that arose was what makes clearly established
law? Directly after announcing “the contours of the right,” the Court
stated: “This is not to say that an official action is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously
been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing
law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”97 What kinds of law makes
the law “apparent” was still unanswered. The current commonly accepted answer is that lower courts must look to the Supreme Court’s
controlling precedent to decipher whether a right was clearly established.98 The Court in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd99 broadly concluded: “We do
not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”100 The
Court cited a Fourth Amendment qualified immunity case, which only
90.

See City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015)
(listing cases in which lower courts wrongfully subjected individual officers
to liability).

91.

Id.

92.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).

93.

Id.

94.

Id. at 640.

95.

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).

96.

Id. at 743.

97.

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (internal citation omitted).

98.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.

99.

563 U.S. 731 (2011).

100. Id. at 741.
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stated that “[d]efendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis,
it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concludeed that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable
competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.”101
The sweeping generalization in al-Kidd ignored controlling precedent to the contrary. In Wilson v. Layne,102 the Court permitted
United States marshals to reference their own policy in considering
whether a reasonable marshal would be able to ascertain case law.103
In this case, officers entered a home pursuant to an arrest warrant,
but they also allowed reporters into the home pursuant to the department’s ride-along policies.104 The reporters took pictures of the home
and observed the officers’ conduct.105 The Court held that bringing the
reporters into the home violated the Fourth Amendment because their
presence “was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.”106
Nevertheless, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because
“the state of the law . . . was at best undeveloped, [so] it was not
unreasonable for law enforcement officers to look and rely on their
formal ride-along policies.”107
Furthermore, in Hope v. Pelzer,108 the Court explicitly relied on a
Department of Corrections regulation, a Department of Justice report,
and the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct to hold that the
defendants did not deserve qualified immunity.109 In this case, prison
guards punished a prisoner by chaining him to a hitching post, shirtless, for 7 hours under the sun.110 The Court held—in addition to
violating clearly established precedent—the prison guards’ actions
were clearly unlawful because a DOJ report and a DOC regulation
told the prison that this practice was unlawful before this incident.111
Beyond the report, the “obvious cruelty” in the guards’ actions should
have put the guards on notice that they were violating the prisoner’s
101. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
102. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
103. Id. at 617.
104. Id. at 607.
105. Id. at 607–08.
106. Id. at 614.
107. Id. at 617.
108. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
109. Id. at 741–42.
110. Id. at 734–35.
111. Id. at 744–45.
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constitutional rights.112 But in al-Kidd, the Court still limited itself to
precedent, and it is commonly accepted that case law is the source of
clearly established law.113
D.

The Saucier Experiment: The Interest in Constitutional
Development

The Supreme Court divided the Harlow test into two questions:
(1) the “constitutional question,” which asks whether a constitutional
right has been violated; and (2) the “qualified-immunity question,”
which asks whether that right was clearly established.114 The Supreme
Court attempted to restrict the way lower courts examine these
questions in Saucier v. Katz.115 In Saucier, the Court declared that
lower courts must address the constitutional question before addressing the qualified-immunity question.116
To justify this, the Court added a new interest to the qualifiedimmunity analysis: constitutional development. The Court stated:
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was
violated on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary
to set forth principles which will become the basis for a holding
that a right is clearly established. This is the process for the
law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our
insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a
constitutional right as the first inquiry. The law might be
deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead
to the question whether the law clearly established that the
officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the
case.117

This is a plain acknowledgment that articulating the boundaries
of constitutional rights is just as valuable as the interests outlined in
112. Id. at 745.
113. See Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of the Habeas Corpus and the Rise
of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the
Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some
Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1247
(2015) (“Hope was short lived.”); Avidan Cover, Reconstructing the Right
Against Excessive Force, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 1773, 1814–16 (2016) (discussing
the Court’s refusal to look beyond case precedent).
114. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001); see supra note 30, and
accompanying text.
115. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
116. Id. at 201.
117. Id.

508

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017
Rebalancing Harlow

Harlow.118 By creating this system, the Court hoped that as courts
ruled on more and more qualified-immunity cases, the law would become clearer and clearer, making it easier for future plaintiffs to recover for violations of their constitutional rights.119 It is plain to see
how increasing the clarity of the law would also further the publicinterest values announced in Harlow. The clearer the law, the more
likely a reasonable official would know the law and hesitate before
acting, thus protecting citizens from unconstitutional discretionary
acts.120 It would also prevent over-deterrence because the clearer the
law is, the more confident officials can be that their actions are constitutional.121
This approach, however, was widely criticized. One critique was
that the sequencing conflicts with the Court’s dedication to constitutional avoidance.122 The Court has long adhered to the rule that if
there are two grounds for deciding a case, one constitutional and one
not, the Court should choose the latter course.123 The doctrine is
based on separation of powers; the judiciary should not infringe on
another branch’s constitutional powers if there is another basis for a
decision.124 Saucier, however, asks courts to decide a constitutional
question essentially as dictum before reaching the true holding of a
case.125 Another major concern related to the practical effects of sequencing is the expenditure of judicial resources in deciding an
unnecessary question.126 Justices opposed to sequencing voiced this
concern often. Their view is best summarized by Justice Breyer:
118. Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 405, 412 (2012).
119. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 674 (2009); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (discussing how absolute and qualified immunity
have evolved through their application by the courts); Bunting v. Mellen,
541 U.S. 1019, 1023–24 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that denial
of review of an unfavorable collateral decision “undermines the purpose
served by initial consideration of the constitutional question, which is to
clarify constitutional rights without undue delay.”).
120. See Chen, supra note 69, at 308 (discussing the benefits of clear
constitutional rules to public officials).
121. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
122. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 428 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
123. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
124. Leong, supra note 119, at 676–77.
125. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275–76 (2006).
126. Leong, supra note 119, at 679–80.
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“[W]hen courts’ dockets are crowded, a rigid ‘order of battle’ makes
little administrative sense . . . .”127 This practical effect also cuts
straight to the core of the Harlow doctrine: sequencing creates more
costs in a doctrine aimed at reducing costs.128 One final criticism
worth noting is that sequencing creates “bad constitutional law.”129
The argument is that when a case raises complex constitutional issues,
the court is not in a good position to decide those issues early in the
proceedings, when most qualified-immunity motions occur.130 Therefore, it would be better to allow the court to avoid deciding the
constitutional question because “[n]o law . . . is better than bad
law.”131 There is data to support this position. Nancy Leong conducted an empirical study of the effects of sequencing and found that most
of the cases denied the existence of a right.132 Thus, sequencing did
not expand constitutional rights as it was intended to do, even though
it created more constitutional law.133
The Court responded to this criticism by rejecting the rigidity of
Saucier in Pearson v. Callahan.134 The Court recognized that sequencing can create unnecessary costs for the judiciary.135 The Court also
recognized the potential for bad constitutional precedent from sequencing.136 Sequencing can create bad constitutional precedent,
according to the Court, for the following reasons: 1) the decision may
be so fact-bound that it has no precedential value,137 2) the value of
deciding the question is reduced when the question will likely be
decided by a higher court,138 3) the decision may rely on an “uncertain
interpretation of state law,”139 4) the factual basis for a claim may be
unclear due to qualified immunity’s assertion at the pleading stage,140
127. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
128. Leong, supra note 119, at 680.
129. Leval, supra note 125, at 1277.
130. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 859 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Leong, supra note 119, at 680–81.
131. Leong, supra note 119, at 681.
132. Id. at 693.
133. Id. at 670.
134. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
135. Id. at 236–37.
136. Id. at 237.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 237–38.
139. Id. at 238.
140. Id. at 238–39.
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and 5) the briefing for the lower court may be “woefully inadequate.”141 The Court also recognized sequencing’s tension with constitutional avoidance.142
However, despite all of the recognized costs of sequencing, the
Court did not forbid lower courts from using the Saucier framework;
it simply made it voluntary. The Court held that judges should be
permitted to use their discretion in deciding which prong of the
qualified-immunity analysis to address first.143 The Court recognized
two situations where sequencing might help the lower courts. First,
there are situations where deciding the constitutional rights question
is necessary to deciding whether that right was clearly established.144
Second, there is a value to developing constitutional precedent “with
respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases in which a
qualified-immunity defense is unavailable.”145 Therefore, the Court
recognized that there are situations where constitutional development
can be useful. While the strict framework of Saucier died with
Pearson, the Court preserved a new interest in qualified immunity:
the possible need for constitutional development.146 It has seen fit to
adhere to Saucier sequencing in cases after Pearson.147
E.

Qualified Immunity and the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in
papers, and effects, against unreasonable
shall not be violated, and no Warrants
probable cause, supported by Oath

their persons, houses,
searches and seizures,
shall issue, but upon
or affirmation, and

141. Id. at 239.
142. Id. at 241.
143. Id. at 236.
144. Id. (quoting Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 581 (6th Cir. 2005)
(Sutton, J., concurring)).
145. Id.
146. See Nancy Leong, Improving Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 377, 384 (2014)
(“Pearson thus reinforces the importance of rights-making and maintains
qualified immunity adjudication as a vehicle for such rights-making.”).
147. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379
(2009) (holding that an assistant principal’s reasonable suspicion that a 13year-old student was distributing drugs did not justify a strip search, but
that he was still qualifiedly immune because he did not violate clearly
established law); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2014)
(holding that a police officer’s use of force, firing 15 shots, to end a car
chase was reasonable and did not violate clearly established law).
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.148

There are two important phrases in this Amendment for the sake
of this analysis: “unreasonable searches and seizures” and “probable
cause.”149
[Probable cause] merely requires that the facts available to the
officer would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief,” that certain items may be contraband or stolen property
or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than
false. A “practical, nontechnical” probability that incriminating
evidence is involved is all that is required.150

Without a warrant, searches and seizures need to meet some level of
reasonableness and depend on the facts before the officer.151 This will
become important as the Court applies qualified immunity to Fourth
Amendment claims.
Post-Harlow, the Court quickly faced cases applying their new
qualified-immunity standard to Fourth Amendment claims. In Malley
v. Briggs152 the Court heard a claim that officers violated two men’s
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by applying for warrants
for their arrest without probable cause.153 A judge signed the warrants
148. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
149. Id.
150. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (citation omitted).
151. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (stating that an
officer does not use excessive force if the officer’s conduct was “objectively
reasonable”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414–15 (1976)
(holding a warrantless public arrest was reasonable even without the
presence of accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement); United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that a full search of person
after arrest based on probable cause is reasonable without a separate
warrant for the search); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (holding that
an officer may seize a person and search them for weapons if they have a
reasonable articulable suspicion the person is going to commit a crime and
that they are armed); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)
(discussing that when a court decides whether to create an exception to the
warrant requirement, it balances the privacy interests of the public against
the legitimate government interests in being unburdened by a warrant);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967) (holding that a search
under the Fourth Amendment occurs when there is a subjective
expectation of privacy and that expectation of privacy is reasonable).
152. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
153. Id. at 338. Interestingly, the lower court did not hear the claim for
qualified immunity until the close of the plaintiff’s case at trial. Id. This
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after they were filed, the men were arrested, but a grand jury did not
indict them.154 The officers argued that they were absolutely immune
because the arrest had been permitted by a judge, and if they were
not absolutely immune, “applying for a warrant is per se objectively
reasonable, provided that the officer believes that the facts alleged in
his affidavit are true.”155 The Court quickly disposed of the officers’
first arguments, stating that it is possible for a situation to be so
“obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded
that a warrant should issue.”156 The Court further laid out a framework for when an officer cannot be qualifiedly immune when sued for
violating constitutional rights even with a warrant: “Only where the
warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence unreasonable . . . will the shield of
immunity be lost.”157 Applying for a warrant would not always be
reasonable because a reasonable officer could know that a warrant
application does not actually establish probable cause. Therefore, before applying for a warrant, officers must use “reasonable professional
judgment.”158
The next year, in Anderson v. Creighton,159 the Court held that
qualified immunity was available to officers sued for allegedly unreasonable warrantless searches.160 According to the plaintiffs, they
were spending a quiet evening at home when, suddenly, a spotlight,
held by officers brandishing shotguns, flashed through their front
door.161 The officers believed that a man suspected of robbery might
be in the house.162 When Mr. Creighton led the officers to the garage
to look at his car, one of the officers punched him in the face claiming
that Mr. Creighton attempted to grab his gun, but Mr. Creighton said
he was only attempting to open the garage door.163 Mrs. Creighton
then phoned her mother but was allegedly kicked by an officer who
seems, on the surface, to go against one of the purposes of qualified
immunity: preventing needless trials.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 339, 345.
156. Id. at 341.
157. Id. at 344–45 (citation omitted).
158. Id. at 346.
159. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
160. Id. at 641.
161. Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985).
162. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 637.
163. Creighton, 766 F.2d at 1270–71.
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grabbed the phone and told her to hang up.164 As the Creightons’ children ran out of the house to safety, officers chased them and allegedly
grabbed and shook the Creightons’ 10-year-old daughter.165 The officers did not find the robbery suspect or any evidence that the
Creightons were involved in the crime, but they arrested Mr.
Creighton for obstructing justice.166 The Creightons argued that qualified immunity should not apply to alleged Fourth Amendment
violations because the core of a Fourth Amendment allegation is
unreasonable conduct, and one cannot reasonably behave unreasonably.167
The Court expressly rejected the Creightons’ contention.168 The
Court principally relied on stare decisis, stating that the Creightons’
argument was invalid because the Court has already applied qualified
immunity to Fourth Amendment violations.169 The Court further
argued that the perceived problem rested on the terminology of the
Fourth Amendment, as opposed to the substance.170 If the Framers
had used “undue” instead of “unreasonable,” the Creightons would
have no argument.171 The Court went on to point out that the liberties guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are an accommodation
between the government and the individual; therefore, reasonableness
applies.172 The Court noted that officers deserve the same deference
for objectively reasonable decisions regarding difficult questions as any
other official.173 The Court reasoned that qualified immunity applies
even in situations of unlawful warrantless searches of innocent parties’
homes.174 Tailoring the analysis to the right creates undue complexity,
in the Court’s view.175 Furthermore, qualified immunity is supposed to
provide protection for officers making reasonable determinations, re-

164. Id. at 1271.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 643–44.
173. Id. at 644.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 645.
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gardless of the nature of the violation alleged.176 On remand, the district court held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.177
The Court held this ground in Saucier.178 In Saucier, the Court
heard similar arguments to those made by the Creightons but
regarding an excessive-force claim.179 The Court previously held that
excessive-force claims should be judged by the “objective reasonableness standard” of the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to a substantive due process standard.180 The plaintiff in Saucier argued that the
merits analysis in excessive-force cases mirrored the immunity
analysis.181 Therefore, officers already receive the protection desired in
Anderson through the excessive-force standard.182 Furthermore, the
plaintiff argued that the standard works well, making the qualifiedimmunity standard “superfluous and inappropriate.”183 The Court disagreed. The Court held that the reasonableness in qualified-immunity
and excessive-force claims were different.184 The Court argued that
qualified-immunity reasonableness was only about whether the officer
made a “reasonable mistake[]” about the applicability of a rule.185 “An
officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a
mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is
legal in those circumstances;” they can make a reasonable mistake
about the rule while violating the rule.186 Qualified immunity, according to the Court, can still protect officers operating in the “hazy
border between excessive and acceptable force.”187
The same stacking of analyses present in the reasonableness
standard is also present in the method for interpreting facts in qualified immunity under the Fourth Amendment. In a typical motion for
summary judgment or motion to dismiss, the facts are interpreted in
176. Id. at 646.
177. Creighton v. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D. Minn. 1989).
178. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204 (2001).
179. Id. at 203–04.
180. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
181. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204.
182. Brief for Respondents at 7, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (No. 991977), 2001 WL 173527, at *5.
183. Id.; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204.
184. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204–05.
185. Id. at 205.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 206 (citing Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir.
2000)).
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the light most favorable to the non-moving party.188 However, this
standard does not fully apply to the qualified-immunity defense.
When qualified immunity is asserted, the Court should “consider[]
only the facts that were knowable to the defendant officers.”189 Therefore, only the facts knowable to the officers may be considered, but
they must be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.190
This idea stems directly from how courts determine objective reasonableness for Fourth Amendment violations. In White v. Pauly,191 the
Court cited a non-qualified-immunity excessive-force decision for this
standard.192 The cited case stated that objective reasonableness must
be determined “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.”193 Therefore, the method of interpreting facts for
a qualified-immunity claim under the Fourth Amendment is the exact
same method as how facts must be interpreted when deciding the
merits of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation.
The Court has not wavered from the holdings of Anderson and
Saucier, and has freely scrutinized facts to determine whether officers
acted unreasonably.194
188. United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
189. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
135 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2015)).
190. Id.
191. 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017).
192. Id. at 550.
193. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015).
194. In 2012, the Court held that it was reasonable for an officer to search for
multiple firearms even though the warrant limited the search to one
firearm, and that the officer was not “entirely unreasonable” in searching
for gang paraphernalia when the officer believed they had probable cause
pursuant to a warrant. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1246–
47 (2012). The Court noted that it was not necessary to decide whether
probable cause existed, but only whether the officers were “plainly
incompetent.” Id. at 1249. In 2013, the Court found that it was not clearly
established that a police officer’s warrantless entry into someone’s backyard
while in hot pursuit of a suspect violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
rights because no case law clearly established this right. Stanton v. Sims,
134 S. Ct. 3, 7 (2013). The Court did not state whether or not the police
officer violated the Fourth Amendment; it stated only that the officer was
not “plainly incompetent.” Id. In 2014, the Court held that officers were
entitled to qualified immunity because they acted reasonably in using
deadly force, by firing fifteen shots, to terminate a high-speed car chase.
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–22 (2014). Therefore, there was
no Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 2024. In 2015, the Court held there
was no Fourth Amendment violation when officers used potentially deadly
force on a mentally ill patient wielding a knife who would not stop

516

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017
Rebalancing Harlow

One of the more recent Fourth Amendment qualified-immunity
cases deserves lengthier attention: Mullenix v. Luna.195 On March 23,
2010, in Tulia, Texas, Israel Leija, Jr., led the police on an 18-minute
car chase on I-27 at speeds between 85–110 miles per hour. He called
the police dispatcher twice saying he had a gun and would shoot the
police if they did not stop the chase. The dispatcher informed pursuing officers of these threats and that Leija may be intoxicated.
Officers—who had received training on how to set up spike strips and
take defensive positions while waiting for the suspect—set up tire
spikes at three locations. One officer arrived after the spike strips
were set and took a position on an overpass above them. He took this
position to explore another tactic: shooting Leija’s car to disable it.
He had never attempted this tactic before and had no training in it.
He told the dispatcher to ask his supervisor whether he should proceed with this tactic, but he took a shooting position before receiving
a response. It was alleged, however, that the officer could hear the
supervisor’s response of “see if the spike strips work first” from his
position. Once Leija’s car came into sight, the officer fired six shots at
the vehicle. The vehicle kept moving, hit the spike strips, hit the
median, and came to a stop. Leija was killed by the officer’s shots,
four of which hit Leija and none of which hit the car.196 When the
officer encountered his supervising officer later, he said, “How’s that
for proactive?”197
The Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity.198 It chastised the
lower court for defining the right at too high a level of specificity.199
The Fifth Circuit defined the right as “it is unreasonable for a police
officer to use deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a
sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others.”200 Instead, the
Supreme Court held the Fifth Circuit should have examined whether

approaching the officers, and the officers’ entry was not unreasonable just
because it caused a violent reaction. City & Cty. of San Francisco v.
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–77 (2015). Despite this holding, the Court
noted that it “need not decide whether the Constitution was violated”
because the officers’ conduct did not violate clearly established precedent.
Id. at 1778.
195. 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015).
196. Id. at 306–07.
197. Id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 312 (majority opinion).
199. Id. at 308–09.
200. Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 725 (5th Cir. 2014).
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the officer acted unreasonably “beyond debate.”201 The Court held
that none of its precedents involving car chases “squarely governs”
this case given the light traffic on I-27 at the time and the threats
Leija made against officers.202 Against this backdrop, the Court could
not conclude that the officer’s actions were “plainly incompetent.”203
While ignoring the constitutional question, the Court did note the
importance of specificity of the Fourth Amendment right because “it
is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant
legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation
the officer confronts.”204
In Mullenix, the Court exhibited several of the trends that have
come up in the development of qualified immunity: (1) it reiterated
the importance of applying qualified immunity to officers;205 (2) it
applied qualified immunity to a reasonableness standard;206 (3) it
reiterated the importance of appropriately defining the right;207 (4) it
ignored rules and policies—here being the supervisor’s order—and
instead focused on judicial precedent;208 and (5) it failed to state
whether or not there was a constitutional violation.

II. Critiques of Qualified Immunity
A.

Qualified Immunity Generally—Weighing Heavily for
the Government
1. Inappropriately Defining Clearly Established Law

Many commentators have criticized the Court’s definition of
clearly established law.209 Though the Court has frequently stated that
prior cases which are factually identical are not required,210 the Court
inevitably searches for factually similar cases.211 Courts, therefore,
201. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309.
202. Id. at 310.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 308.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 310.
209. See infra notes 225–229, 231, 236, 238–240 and accompanying text.
210. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
211. Karen Blum et al., Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left
for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633, 656 (2013); Cover, supra note 113,
at 1792; Jeffries, supra note 78, at 257.
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compare the facts of the case before it to these similar precedents.
This “extends qualified immunity beyond any defensible rationale.”212
Making judges search for factually similar cases creates a cover for
judges to overlook liability in cases that may merit liability.213 There
can be conduct that is both unconstitutional and unreasonable, yet escapes liability because no case is exactly on point.214 The Court
seemed to recognize this concern in Hope when it did not limit its
search for clearly established law to precedent.215 However, in
Brosseau v. Haugen,216 the Court “veered back toward requiring precedential specificity.”217
Brosseau also represents the paradigm of this issue in determining
clearly established law. In Brosseau, officers responded to a call that
men were fighting in a yard.218 When the officers arrived, Haugen—
one of the fighting men—disappeared. The officers searched for 30 to
45 minutes. When the officers heard a report that Haugen was down
the street, an officer ran to pursue. When she arrived, Haugen appeared and jumped into a jeep. The officer arrived at the jeep, drew her
gun, and told Haugen to get out of the vehicle. Haugen ignored the
commands and looked for the keys. The officer struck Haugen in the
head with her gun, but Haugen still found the keys and started the
car. Once Haugen began to drive, the officer shot him because she
thought other officers in the area or citizens would be in danger with
him driving. Haugen suffered a collapsed lung but survived.219 The
Court examined three cases and held: “These three cases taken
together undoubtedly show that this area is one in which the result
depends very much on the facts of each case.”220 Therefore, no case
clearly established a violation of the Fourth Amendment.221 Although
it may seem that the use of deadly force was unreasonable because
there was no evidence Haugen had a weapon or intended to do anyone

212. Jeffries, supra note 78, at 256.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.; see also supra notes 102–112 and accompanying text (describing cases
where the Court defined “clearly established law” broadly, beyond just
Supreme Court precedent).
216. 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
217. Jeffries, supra note 78, at 257.
218. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 195.
219. Id. at 195–97.
220. Id. at 201.
221. Id.
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harm, the Court could not answer that question because no case was
on point.
Furthermore, requiring plaintiffs to find precedent with this level
of specificity creates a heightened standard that is difficult to
overcome.222 The ambiguity in the definition of the right223 means that
clearly established law has to be at “a very specific level of
generality.”224 The narrower the right, the more difficult it is to find
factually similar precedent.225 This makes any claim that a right was
clearly established likely to fail and converts qualified immunity to
near absolute immunity.226
2. Inappropriate Fact-Finding

Some commentators believe that the legal analysis in qualified
immunity is actually a factual analysis best reserved for the jury.227
The Supreme Court proclaims that qualified immunity is supposed to
be a legal question decided by a court.228 In reality, asking courts to
decide whether the right was clearly established is a mixed question of
law and fact.229 This creates several issues. First, asking a court to
decide what a reasonable official would think was legal asks judges to
put themselves in the defendant’s shoes.230 They must look at the
facts and decide how a reasonable officer would perceive them in light
of the law.231 Construing facts is necessarily the job of the fact-finder
at trial, not a judge before trial.232 Second, many potential qualifiedimmunity cases involve competing narratives with disputed facts,
222. Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L.
REV. 123, 151 (1999).
223. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (discussing how the lower
court incorrectly found clearly established law).
224. Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who
Should Pay?, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 988 (1989).
225. Jeffries, supra note 63, at 859.
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 78, at 252.
228. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991).
229. Jeffries, supra note 78, at 252; Alan K.
Immunity: Summary Judgment and the
Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 7
Restructuring of Narrative and Empathy
KENT L. REV. 819, 827 (1997).

Chen, The Burdens of Qualified
Role of Facts in Constitutional
(1997); Sheldon Nahmod, The
in Section 1983 Cases, 72 CHI.-

230. Nahmod, supra note 229, at 828–29.
231. Id. at 828.
232. Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the
Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 940 (2015).
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making it inappropriate for a court to resolve these factual disputes in
deciding whether a right was clearly established.233 Third, because
qualified immunity is typically raised early in the proceedings, the
court denies plaintiffs the opportunity to appropriately develop their
narrative and facts.234 Plaintiffs are denied an opportunity for discovery and therefore must present a “barebones” version of their story.235
Fourth, the effects of the factual analysis are in tension with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.236 The Harlow standard asks judges
to be more proactive in resolving cases than contemplated by Rules 12
and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the standards laid out
by those rules are in tension with how judges view facts in qualified
immunity.237
This problem is evident in Mullenix. Justice Sotomayor’s lone
dissent framed her approach as the appropriate way to evaluate the
facts.238 She claimed that the majority ignored the officer asking for
permission to shoot from his supervisor and spent minutes in shooting
position before Leija arrived.239 Instead, “[t]he majority recharacterizes
[the officer]’s decision to shoot at Leija’s engine block as a splitsecond, heat-of-the-moment choice, made when the suspect was
‘moments away.’”240 Instead of construing the facts in favor of the
plaintiff, the majority reframed the facts in a manner advantageous to
the officer.
3. Lack of Constitutional Development

The discretion granted by the Court in Pearson comes at the
price of constitutional development. Courts have significant incentives
to avoid analyzing the merits of the case and skip straight to the
clearly established prong.241 One of the main critiques of Saucier is
233. Nahmod, supra note 229, at 831–32.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Jeffries, supra note 78, at 251.
237. Id. at 251–52.
238. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 313, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“Resolving all factual disputes in favor of plaintiffs, as the
Court must on a motion for summary judgment,” and “[a]n appropriate
reading of the record on summary judgment would thus render Mullenix’s
choice even more unreasonable.”).
239. Id. at 316.
240. Id.
241. Cover, supra note 113, at 1789–90; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the
Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 131
(2009).
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that it expended unnecessary judicial resources.242 Now, free from Saucier, overworked judges may want to take the “short route” instead of
dealing with the merits of a case.243 This creates future costs.244 Judges
constantly taking the easy way out in one area of the law creates a
situation where “civil rights questions go repeatedly unanswered.”245
This becomes a cycle where a constitutional violation need not be answered “because the law is unclear and the law is unclear because the
violation continues to go unaddressed.”246
White provides a telling example. In this case, police responded to
a road rage incident where a man had a nonviolent confrontation with
two women on the highway. After the confrontation, the man went
home, where he lived with his brother. Two officers arrived at the
house and “approached it in a covert manner to maintain officer
safety.”247 When the officers spotted two men in the house, they called
Officer White for backup. When the brothers realized there was someone outside their home, they shouted, wanting to know who was
outside. The two officers laughed and informed the brothers they were
surrounded and needed to come out. At some point one of the officers
identified themselves as state police, but the brothers did not hear the
announcement. They informed the officers that they had guns. Officer
White arrived in time to hear the brothers shout they had guns and
immediately drew his gun. The man then stepped out of the house
and fired two shots, and his brother stepped out of the house and
pointed his gun towards Officer White. Officer White shot and killed
the brother.248 The brother’s estate sued all three officers for violating
his Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court for the District of
New Mexico denied the officers’ motions for qualified immunity, and
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The lower courts
analyzed the qualified-immunity claim of Officer White separately
from the other officers since he arrived at the scene later.249 The
Tenth Circuit determined that it was clearly established that “a reasonable officer in White’s position would believe that a warning [of
the use of force] was required despite the threat of serious harm.”250
242. Jeffries, supra note 241, at 126–27.
243. Id. at 131.
244. Id.
245. Cover, supra note 113, at 1790.
246. Id.
247. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 549 (2017).
248. Id. at 549–50.
249. Id. at 550.
250. Id. at 551.
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The Tenth Circuit also held that a jury could reasonably conclude
that White used excessive force.251
The Supreme Court vacated the denial of White’s qualifiedimmunity claim and remanded.252 It did not address whether Officer
White violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it held that no
clearly established rights were violated.253 It was reasonable for White
to assume proper procedure had been followed prior to his arrival.254 It
further recognized that because of White’s delayed arrival, this case
was unique factually.255 Because of that uniqueness, “[n]o settled
Fourth Amendment principle requires that officer[s] . . . second-guess
the earlier steps already taken by [their] fellow officers in instances
like the one White confronted here.”256 Now, there most likely never
will be. The Court recognized that this is a unique situation, in terms
of finding similar precedent,257 yet it refused to take this opportunity
to clearly establish whether or not this is a violation. Though the situation may be unique in terms of Supreme Court precedent, it is not
a stretch to assume that officers arriving at scenes late is not unique.
But because the Court had not ruled on this specific fact pattern
before, it could not rule on it here. This case furthers a situation
where a constitutional violation need not be answered “because the
law is unclear, and the law is unclear because the violation continues
to go unaddressed.”258
4. Lack of Subjectivity

Eliminating subjectivity from the Harlow standard leaves the gap
mentioned in Scheuer.259 Objective intent now trumps intentional
wrongdoing.260 Justice Stevens stated that the lack of subjectivity in
the immunity analysis causes problems in two kinds of cases: (1) cases
where the court awards damages only if a culpable state of mind is
established; and (2) if the official’s conduct is regulated by “an ex-

251. Id. at 550–51.
252. Id. at 553.
253. Id. at 552.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Cover, supra note 113, at 1790.
259. See supra Part I.C., D.
260. Cover, supra note 113, at 1790.
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tremely general and deeply entrenched norm, such as the command of
due process or probable cause.”261
The second problem is present in many qualified-immunity
cases—especially Fourth Amendment cases. The Fourth Amendment
standards are “extremely general and deeply entrenched.”262 This
exact problem is evident in Mullenix, where, after the officer disobeyed a supervisor and fired six shots at a speeding car, he said
“How’s that for proactive?”263 This comment, however, has no impact
on the immunity analysis because the analysis only focuses on
objective reasonableness. If subjective intent had been a factor, the officer’s comment and refusal to follow orders could have shifted the
case towards a denial of immunity.
B.

Qualified Immunity and the Fourth Amendment
1. Double Reasonableness Protection

The arguments offered by the plaintiffs in Anderson and Saucier
decrying the double reasonableness of Fourth Amendment qualified
immunity—double reasonableness being the stacking of one reasonableness analysis on top of another—have been supported by both
Justices and commentators.264 Justice Stevens critiqued double reasonableness in his dissent in Anderson. He described probable cause as a
form of immunity in and of itself.265 Thus, by applying qualified
immunity in Anderson, the Court created a double layer of insulation
for law enforcement officers.266 He claimed that there was no reason to
create this double layer of immunity when “the probable-cause standard itself recognizes the fair leeway that law enforcement officers must
have in carrying out their dangerous work.”267 The Harlow standard in
this context does no more to encourage action when officers are
uncertain of the law than the existing Fourth Amendment standard.268
261. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 656 n.12 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
262. Id.
263. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
264. See infra notes 265–295 and accompanying text; but see, e.g., Wesby v.
District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“This inquiry into
the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the officers' actions parallels but
does not duplicate the reasonableness aspect of the Fourth Amendment
probable cause analysis.”), cert. granted 137 S. Ct. 826 (2017).
265. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 660 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 659.
267. Id. at 661.
268. Id. at 664, 664 n. 20.
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Therefore, while the Court’s aims were noble, Justice Stevens felt that
the Court’s holding double counted the officer’s interest, while an
individual’s interest gets counted only once.269 Justice Ginsburg renewed this criticism in her concurrence in Saucier. She stated that the
Court’s excessive-force standard is “sufficient to resolve cases.”270
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the Court’s double reasonableness
will lead to confusion for lower courts.271 This confusion arises because
the constitutional inquiry and immunity inquiry ask the same
question: “Taking into account the particular circumstances confronting the defendant officer, could a reasonable officer, identically
situated, have believed the force employed was lawful?”272 This confusion places added difficulty on courts in Fourth Amendment qualifiedimmunity cases.273 Courts must attempt to distinguish the two
reasonableness analyses, even though they seem indistinguishable.274
Even if the double reasonableness could easily be distinguished,
the confusion and discomfort with a double-reasonableness analysis
can be shown by the following example: A jury could find that it is
objectively unreasonable to tase a handcuffed suspect, but a judge
may find that no case law made the officer’s actions unreasonable.275
Further,
if the jury believes the plaintiff, the use of force is going to be
objectively unreasonable and there is not going to be qualified
immunity. But you are going to have the rare case where you
could have both unreasonable force and qualified immunity due
to the lack of clarity in the law.276

Therefore, the Court has created a standard where an officer can
reasonably act unreasonably. This creates even more deference for the
officer than originally envisioned in Harlow.277
This double reasonableness also creates practical issues. The
confusion and deference created has led lower courts to find immunity
269. Id. at 664.
270. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Hassel, supra note 222, at 144.
274. Id.
275. Erwin Chemerinsky & Karen M. Blum, Fourth Amendment Stops, Arrests
and Searches in the Context of Qualified Immunity, 25 TOURO L. REV.
781, 786–87 (2009).
276. Id. at 787.
277. Id. at 786.
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in situations when “liability seems fully justified.”278 Furthermore,
double reasonableness creates more avenues for inappropriate factfinding by the judge.279 Justice Stevens’ dissent in Brosseau supports
this view, stating that the appropriate question in Brosseau was “how
a reasonable officer making the split-second decision to use deadly
force would have assessed the foreseeability of a serious accident.”280
Justice Stevens argued that no matter how strong the interest in resolving these cases at early stages, there was no justification in taking
away this fact question from the jury.281 Therefore, the general
problem of courts answering fact questions as legal questions is even
greater in the Fourth Amendment context.
2. Difficulty in Enforcing the Fourth Amendment

The Supreme Court’s emphasis on appropriately defining the right
has come at the cost of making it difficult to enforce the Fourth
Amendment. In Mullenix, the Court reversed the denial of qualified
immunity because the right was defined too broadly.282 Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent chastises the Court for creating a culture of
“shoot first, think later.”283 Justice Sotomayor notes that this culture
makes “the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.”284 While
the approach Justice Sotomayor discusses also involves inappropriately scrutinizing facts,285 the approach relies heavily on the level of
specificity of the right. By repeatedly emphasizing the need to
specifically define the right, the Court renders the Fourth Amendment
“hollow”286 because no clearly established law can unambiguously
define such a specific right. The Fourth Amendment is uniquely difficult because it involves officers applying broad standards to specific
situations.287 When the right is defined too specifically, no Fourth
278. Jeffries, supra note 78, at 267–68. See id. at 268–69 (providing an example
where the district court found two officers’ use of deadly force to be
objectively unreasonable but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals still
reversed, finding the officers to be qualifiedly immune due to lack of
clarity).
279. Cover, supra note 113, at 1802.
280. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 206 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. Id.
282. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015).
283. Id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
284. Id.
285. See supra Part II.A.
286. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 308 (majority opinion).
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Amendment violation can be clearly established; this causes the
Fourth Amendment to lose its teeth, leaving it difficult to enforce.288
3. Clearly Established Law Defined by Case Law Is Inappropriate

Using case law to define reasonableness overestimates a typical
officer’s knowledge of case law. The ability to parse complex rules
from a body of case law is a skill people attend law school for three
years to acquire.289 It therefore seems preposterous to create a standard that expects officers to be familiar with complex, ever-changing
case law when they are better versed in local policies.290 This overly
technical idea of notice should be inapplicable when there is, instead,
a “common social duty” not to do something one should know is
wrong.291 Similarly, police officers should feel a “common social duty”
not to use excessive force absent precedent putting them on notice in
a factually similar situation.292
4. The Lens for Interpreting Facts Is the Same Lens as the Fourth
Amendment

Just as the qualified-immunity reasonableness analysis is the same
as that for Fourth Amendment reasonableness, facts are interpreted
similarly in qualified-immunity and in Fourth Amendment cases.
Qualified immunity takes the facts that were knowable to the officer
at the time, which is the same method used to interpret facts in
Fourth Amendment cases.293 Though admittedly not as troublesome
as double reasonableness, this stacking of similar analyses distances
the analysis from the actual case and facts in a manner that is unnecessary and confusing.
5. Financial Costs and Deterrence Claims Are Unfounded

Though one of the main motivations for the Harlow standard is
the prevention of personal-liability costs and over-deterrence, these
288. The Fourth Amendment can still be enforced in the criminal context, but
even then, the Fourth Amendment’s enforcement is limited by the
exclusionary rule. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011)
(holding that evidence cannot be excluded even when obtaining the
evidence violated the Fourth Amendment as long as the officer reasonably
relied on binding court decisions).
289. Jeffries, supra note 63, at 865.
290. See Cover, supra note 113, at 1814 (advocating for the incorporation of
use-of-force policies into clearly established law).
291. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (citation omitted);
Jeffries, supra note 63, at 865.
292. Jeffries, supra note 63, at 865.
293. See supra notes 189–204 and accompanying text.
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fears do not seem founded on reality.294 Joanna Schwartz’s study
shows that police officers rarely contribute financially to the settlement or judgment of a civil-rights case.295 She also stated that other
studies indicate that officers’ conduct is not substantially influenced
by potential liability in civil-rights suits.296 Consequently, she concluded that, to the extent qualified immunity aims at protecting
officers from the financial burdens of suit and preventing overdeterrence, qualified immunity’s stringent standards have no justification.297

III. A New Balance to Qualified Immunity in the
Fourth Amendment
This Section lays out the argument for a new qualified-immunity
standard in the context of the Fourth Amendment. First, it discusses
why the Fourth Amendment should have its own qualified-immunity
standard. Then, it presents the new standard.
A.

Why the Fourth Amendment Deserves Its Own Qualified-Immunity
Standard

Fourth Amendment qualified immunity materially differs from
qualified immunity in other contexts. This is largely due to the
double-reasonableness problem.298 Qualified immunity works best with
definite rules and doctrines that create a stable body of law that can
easily be clearly established.299 Qualified immunity “works least well
when constitutional doctrine is stated at a very high level of generality unaccompanied by particularizing doctrine.”300 The doctrines developed from the Fourth Amendment are such standards.301 They are
defined at a high level of generality.302 The standards are all based on
reasonableness—a far cry from a stable rule because reasonableness
294. Cover, supra note 113, at 1786.
295. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 914,
939 (2014).
296. Id. at 943.
297. Id.
298. See supra Part II.B.1.
299. Jeffries, supra note 63, at 859.
300. Id. at 859–60.
301. See supra Part I.E.
302. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (using the Fourth
Amendment as an example of defining a right at too high a level of
generality).
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varies from situation to situation. Therefore, due to the high generality, vague standards, and specialized problems discussed above,303
the Harlow standard does not work well with the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, double reasonableness makes it more difficult for courts
to avoid engaging in fact-finding on a supposedly purely legal question.304 Also, the Fourth Amendment standards mimic the qualifiedimmunity analysis.305 They permit reasonable error, which is part of
qualified-immunity’s aim,306 and they interpret facts the same way.307
Therefore, courts essentially perform the same analysis twice.
These arguments would lay a convincing foundation for abolishing
qualified immunity in Fourth Amendment settings. If the Fourth
Amendment allows for reasonable mistakes and interprets facts the
same way as qualified immunity, then the easiest solution would be to
eliminate qualified immunity in this context.308
However appealing this argument may be, it is impractical. The
Supreme Court decided that alleged Fourth Amendment violations
deserve potential qualified-immunity protection long ago, and it refuses to waver.309 The Supreme Court wants to afford officers some
kind of extra protection in these situations beyond Fourth Amendment standards. Thus, the best solution would be to recognize that
the Fourth Amendment creates special problems for qualified immunity, and fixing those problems requires a specialized solution.310

303. See supra Part II.B.
304. See supra Part II.B.1.
305. Id.
306. Jeffries, supra note 63, at 860–61.
307. See supra Part II.B.4.
308. See Jeffries, supra note 63, at 861 (“One might have thought that
qualified immunity would simply merge into the merits.”).
309. See supra Part I.E.; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987)
(“The general rule of qualified immunity is intended to provide government
officials with the ability ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may
give rise to liability for damages.’ . . . Where that rule is applicable,
officials can know that they will not be held personally liable as long as
their actions are reasonable in light of current American law.” (internal
citation omitted)).
310. This is not to say that other Amendments do not deserve their own
standard as well, or that the new standard that will be argued below could
not be applicable to qualified immunity generally. Such an argument is
outside the scope of this Note. The standard outlined below was created
with the issues of qualified immunity generally and in the context of the
Fourth Amendment in mind.
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The New Balance

To address the problems with qualified immunity in the Fourth
Amendment context, this Note proposes two major alterations to the
analysis: (1) the constitutional question should be eliminated from the
analysis, and (2) courts should balance three factors to decide whether
a case should proceed to trial. The three factors should be the subjective prong of Scheuer,311 a reasonableness test based on what a
reasonable officer would have done, and a question asking whether
allowing the case to proceed to trial and thus get a decision on the
merits “will be ‘beneficial’ in ‘develop[ing] constitutional precedent.’”312
1. Removing the Constitutional Question

Removing the question of whether there was a constitutional
violation from the qualified-immunity analysis clarifies that the
qualified-immunity question is separate from the constitutional
question. Qualified immunity is not about whether there was a violation; it is about protecting officials reasonably exercising their
discretion.313 Entertaining the idea of whether there was a constitutional violation as a basis for immunity is a recipe for the creation
of bad law.314 Neither the judge nor the defendant has an incentive to
address the question adequately because immunity necessarily hinges
on the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct.315 Furthermore, the
immunity question and the constitutional question in the Fourth
Amendment context are essentially the same question, and they are
analyzed in the same way.316 Eliminating the constitutional question
will help distinguish the two analyses and brings qualified immunity
closer to eliminating the double-reasonableness problem. Finally, due
to the complexity and fact-laden analysis of Fourth Amendment violations, courts are not in a good position to decide these questions definitively.317 Qualified immunity is difficult enough to navigate as it is,
so shifting the focus will allow for a more cohesive analysis.
This would not preclude the courts from answering the
constitutional question before trial. Defendants still could attempt to
311. See supra Part I.B.
312. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014) (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
313. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
314. Leval, supra note 125, at 1277.
315. Id. at 1278.
316. See supra Part II.B.1. (discussing double reasonableness).
317. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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dispose of a case before trial through a motion to dismiss or a motion
for summary judgment based on the constitutionality of the defendants’ actions.318 In fact, this is a more appropriate place for adjudicating whether or not there was a constitutional violation before trial.
Qualified immunity currently confuses the rules of civil procedure.319 A
case should be dismissed before trial on a constitutional question only
if a reasonable jury could not find for the plaintiff.320 Removing the
constitutional question will allow courts to adjudicate the constitutional question appropriately by forcing defendants to use the proper
channels of civil procedure.
2. The Three-Pronged Balancing Test

The three-pronged balancing test would ask three questions that
would be balanced to decide whether an officer is immune: (1)
whether the plaintiff has pled enough facts to prove malice, (2)
whether a reasonable officer would engage in the same conduct, and
(3) whether allowing the case to proceed to trial “will be ‘beneficial’ in
‘develop[ing] constitutional precedent.’”321 Each question will be explained in the following sections.
a. Reincorporating Pre-Harlow Subjectivity

The first factor will ask the court to examine whether the plaintiff
pled enough facts to prove malice. The lack of subjectivity in Harlow
creates situations where an officer can have apparent or obvious bad
intent but still escape liability because the law is unclear. Qualified
immunity is not intended to protect these officers; it is supposed to
protect officers using appropriate discretion. Bad intent is inherently
not an appropriate use of discretion. Therefore, the pre-Harlow test
correctly emphasized the importance of an intertwined subjective and
objective narrative.322
This prong is necessary in the context of Fourth Amendment
qualified immunity for two reasons. First, officers perform a fastpaced, dangerous job where they need to make decisions in a split second. Because of how quickly they need to make decisions, it might be
easier for emotions to get the best of proper judgment in particularly
intense situations. Therefore, situations where this has occurred
should not go overlooked, so that it may set a precedent and en318. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 56.
319. Jeffries, supra note 78, at 251. See also supra Part II.A.2.
320. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 56.
321. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014) (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
322. See supra Parts I.B., II.A.4.
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courage officers and police departments to ensure that their training
minimizes this danger. Second, subjectivity is most needed in situations where the discretionary standard is broad and difficult to
define.323 The Fourth Amendment standards are both: they rely on an
officer’s reasonableness, and they are definable only in relation to
facts. Abuse of that discretion is more likely and more dangerous in
this standard because the abuse is easier to hide.
b. Would a Reasonable Officer Engage in the Same Conduct?

This prong asks the court to examine the reasonableness of the
officer’s actions. It makes two significant changes: (1) it removes
constitutionality from the reasonableness inquiry, and (2) it focuses on
the officer’s actions as opposed to clearly established law.
Removing constitutionality from the reasonableness inquiry is a
necessary step for two reasons. First, removing the constitutional
question requires shifting the whole analysis away from deciding the
constitutionality of the officer’s actions in any way. Second, in order
to eliminate double reasonableness, the objective standard needs to
shift away from constitutionality entirely.
Focusing on the officer’s conduct shifts the analysis away from
clearly established law and the problems that come with it. The
analysis is focused on what an officer did as opposed to comparing
what the officer did to judicial precedent. This removes the problems
inherent in searching for clearly established law.324
This prong also creates a more realistic reasonableness standard
than clearly established law. It will allow courts to look beyond case
precedent in deciding the reasonableness of an officer’s actions. Courts
would be able to look at factors that are more relevant in informing
an officer’s actions, such as department policies. Using department
policies grounds the reasonableness analysis in the reality of an
officer’s job because they actually use these policies. This shift also
better captures the goals of qualified immunity. Since qualified immunity aims to protect officials using reasonable discretion, it is best
to judge that discretion by the policies actually informing it. Case law
in the murky waters of the Fourth Amendment most likely do not inform most officer’s actions from day to day. It is complicated and not
easy to apply to a fact pattern,325 especially in the split second given
to an officer to make a life or death decision. Police-department policies, however, are made for officers to inform them on how to act in
323. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 656 n.12 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (explaining the problems associated with the purely objective
standard set out in Harlow).
324. See supra Parts II.A.1., II.B.3.
325. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015).
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any situation. Removing the standard from clearly established law
and constitutionality allows the courts to refocus the analysis on factors that more directly inform officers’ actions.
c. Whether Allowing the Case to Proceed to Trial “will be ‘beneficial’ in
‘develop[ing] constitutional precedent’”326

This standard asks courts to determine whether there is a need for
constitutional development given the facts of the case. Though this interest was not present in Harlow, the Court emphasized it in Saucier,
and it did not go away. Pearson gives courts leeway to structure the
analysis in a way to develop constitutional law. They structure this
approach by deciding whether it “will be ‘beneficial’ in ‘develop[ing]
constitutional precedent.’”327
This standard also preserves the Supreme Court’s encouragement
to explore the clarity of precedent. Case law could still be examined
under the objective prong, but not with the same thoroughness as the
clearly established law standard. Under this proposal, instead of asking whether the law is clearly established, courts would have to
examine how clearly established the law is. The less clear the law is,
the more beneficial it might be to allow the case to proceed to trial
and resolve the case on the merits. The clearer the law is, the less the
court should care about constitutional development in deciding
whether to allow the case to proceed to the merits.
This standard does not give courts inappropriate discretion.
Judges would examine this question in the same fashion they examine
whether a right is clearly established: look at precedent and decipher
whether there are clear rules. This factor only reframes the analysis so
that instead of deciding whether something is clearly established,
courts would look at how clearly established the law is.
Furthermore, asking judges to examine the need for constitutional
development balances the concerns of the Saucier framework and the
shortcomings of the current regime. The main critique of Saucier was
that it ignored the doctrine of constitutional avoidance by deciding
constitutional questions as dictum, leading to bad constitutional rulings.328 But the current regime creates a cycle where constitutional
violations go unaddressed.329 Asking courts to consider the clarity of
constitutional law avoids the critiques of Saucier because the judge
would no longer have to decide any constitutional question. It also addresses the problems of the current regime by asking judges to di326. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2020 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
327. Id.
328. See supra Part I.D.
329. See supra Part II.A.3.

533

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 2·2017
Rebalancing Harlow

rectly examine how constitutional violations may or may not go
unaddressed in similar situations.
This prong is important for the Fourth Amendment. Fourth
Amendment standards are vague, broad, and largely fact dependent.
Because of this, under the current qualified-immunity standard, it is
incredibly difficult to find clearly established law. There can be many
unique fact patterns, making it difficult to find exactly matching precedent.330 This creates a situation where a right can never become
clearly established because it was not clearly established in the first
place.331 Encouraging judges to critically examine the landscape of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in relation to the current fact pattern gives judges discretion to clearly establish the Fourth Amendment, which hopefully will lead to fewer Fourth Amendment
violations.
3. Balancing the Factors

After examining the three factors, courts would then balance
them and decide whether the scales tip in favor of the government
and a finding of immunity, or the plaintiff and proceeding to trial. It
would be in the court’s discretion to determine how to weigh the
factors, but the following situations illustrate how it could work. In
situations where there is substantial evidence of malice, the first prong
would weigh heavily in favor of proceeding to trial, and perhaps could
even be dispositive on the immunity issue. When an officer’s conduct
is obviously reasonable given departmental policies, no matter how
underdeveloped the law is, the court should hold the officer immune.
The final prong should never be dispositive, but it will be informative
in situations between the extremes of subjectivity and objectivity. In
fact, the gray area between the extremes is the exact reason why the
final prong is important: it encourages courts to decide whether the
gray area needs to be clarified.
The case-by-case nature of this balancing is not in tension with
Harlow’s emphasis on preventing over-deterrence.332 As discussed
above, officers are not deterred by the threat of liability.333 Therefore,
creating a more case-by-case balancing standard should have no effect
on an officer’s conduct.

330. See supra Parts II.A.2., II.B.3.
331. See supra Part II.A.3.
332. See supra Part I.C. (discussing the current qualified immunity standard).
333. See supra Part II.B.5. (discussing that financial costs and deterrence
claims are unfounded).
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IV. Comparison to Other Proposals
This section will compare the three-factor balancing test to three
other proposed solutions to qualified immunity.
A.

Changing the Standard to a Rule

Alan Chen argues that qualified immunity should be converted
from a standard to a rule under which officials either are absolutely
immune or must defend the merits.334 This argument is largely based
on the premise that courts engage in balancing when faced with
qualified-immunity claims. He argues that any standard involving a
reasonableness inquiry is necessarily a balancing test because it is
“open-ended.”335 The case-by-case reasonableness inquiry of Harlow
“grants courts greater discretion in balancing the importance of
enforcing a constitutional right against the value of efficient functioning of government.”336 Chen argues that a rule-based immunity creates
several benefits. First, it eliminates the distortion of the underlying
constitutional standard.337 Second, it “promote[s] the advancement of
substantive constitutional law by permitting adjudication of
substantive, rather than procedural, issues.”338 Third, a rule-based
immunity facilitates more development of substantive constitutional
law.339 Finally, rule-based immunity creates more public interest in
immunity issues.340 The rule could be based on a number of different
variables. It could be based on the types of officials,341 the officials’
subjective belief in the lawfulness of their conduct, perhaps based on
whether they were lawfully authorized,342 or a hybrid of different
variables.343
This proposal certainly appeals to a desire to abolish qualified
immunity. It is unjust for officials who violate someone’s constitutional rights to be immune simply because the right at issue was not
clearly established when the violation occurred. Chen’s proposal also
would promote the advancement of constitutional law, which could
334. Chen, supra note 69, at 332.
335. Id. at 291.
336. Id. at 292.
337. Id. at 336.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 337.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 333.
342. Id. at 334.
343. Id. at 335.
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put officials more on notice of their actions, which in turn could lead
to fewer inadvertent constitutional violations.
However appealing this proposal may be, the Supreme Court has
absolutely refused to back down from the principles of qualified immunity. The Court repeatedly has stated that officials should be held
to a reasonableness standard in order to protect both the government’s interests and the public’s interests.344 Therefore, though desirable, Chen’s proposal seems impracticable at this point.
Chen’s analysis is also based on a faulty assumption about how
the qualified-immunity doctrine functions. Though Chen argues that
qualified immunity requires case-by-case balancing, qualified immunity functions more like a checklist than a balancing act. Unless
courts can answer both the constitutional and qualified-immunity
questions in the affirmative, the case cannot proceed. Unless courts
can find factually similar precedent, a right was not clearly established. Though courts have discretion in interpreting whether a right
was violated and the relatedness of precedent, the actual functioning
of qualified immunity relies less on open-ended reasonableness than a
regimented scheme. There is less wiggle room for policy balancing
than Chen de-scribes. Harlow itself is the result of a balancing of
interests, but that balancing created a scheme that courts must
adhere to, not a scheme that lets courts balance those same Harlow
interests from case to case.
The three-factor proposal takes away the checklist aspect of
qualified immunity and converts it back to a balancing of interests,
which is what gives it an advantage over Chen’s proposal. Qualified
immunity is supposed to represent a compromise between public interests and government interests,345 but it is currently more similar to
the kind of bright-line rule Chen advocates. Chen’s proposal takes
away any kind of interest balancing, when what is needed is a fairer
interest balancing.
Chen might take particular issue with the constitutionaldevelopment factor of the three-factor proposal. He might say that it
grants courts more of the kind of discretion he fears they have in the
current qualified-immunity regime. But the constitutional-development factor only reframes the discretion to change the balance. In the
current qualified immunity regime, a right not being clearly established weighs in the government’s favor.346 But in the three-factor
proposal, a right not being clearly established weighs in the public’s
favor. The constitutional-development factor removes the discretion
344. See supra Part I.
345. See supra Part I.B.
346. See supra Part II.A.1.
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courts have to hide behind clearly established law as a reason to not
address the merits. Therefore, the three-factor proposal better addresses the dangerous discretion given to courts by changing how it is
weighed.
B.

“Clearly Unconstitutional”347

John Jeffries argues that the “clearly established law” prong
should be replaced with a “clearly unconstitutional” prong.348 Jeffries
bases this argument on the idea that qualified immunity is no longer a
reasonableness test; it is a recklessness or gross-negligence standard.349
Though Harlow envisioned a reasonableness standard, the Court has
significantly raised the bar.350 The principle of notice embedded in
qualified immunity should be broader than merely factually similar
precedent.351 An unreasonable constitutional violation is not suddenly
reasonable because the Court has not previously said this is a violation.352 But these acts are outside of qualified immunity because the
clearly established law prong is “hyper-technical and unbalanced.”353
Therefore, Jeffries argues for a shift back to reasonableness.354 “Clearly
unconstitutional” embodies this shift.355 It signals a less rigid and
technical process of determining reasonableness.356 This signal leads to
a broader idea of notice, not firmly planted in precedent.357 It moves
the analysis away from precedent and more toward a “common social
duty.”358 Outrageous conduct could now be deemed “clearly unconstitutional,” whereas the outrageousness of the conduct is not
important in the Harlow standard as currently interpreted.359
Jeffries’s solution solves many of the Harlow standard’s problems.
It frees qualified immunity from a search for factually similar precedent. It allows courts to look at the totality of the circumstances
347. Jeffries, supra note 78, at 263.
348. Id.; Jeffries, supra note 63, at 867.
349. Jeffries, supra note 78, at 258.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 260.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 262.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 263.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 262.
358. Id. at 263 (quoting Nash v. U.S., 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913)).
359. Id. at 263–64.
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informing an official’s conduct, which could allow the court to consider the possibility of malice.360 It also better embodies the goals of
Harlow: protecting officials using reasonable discretion.
But Jeffries’s solution still leaves many of Harlow’s problems intact. First, it does not address inappropriate judicial fact-finding.361
Asking whether something is clearly unconstitutional is just as much
a mixed question of law and fact as clearly established law.362 Courts
still have to look at the facts from an officer’s perspective in order to
decide how a reasonable officer would view them. Reasonableness,
therefore, is necessarily a fact question, even if it is couched in more
appropriate terms. This leads to the same problems created by
Harlow’s inappropriate fact-finding.363 In fact, it is possible the clearly
unconstitutional standard would lead to even more inappropriate factfinding, because comparing case facts to past cases is inherently
simpler than looking at the totality of the circumstances to find a
“common social duty.”364 Therefore, the necessary complexity and
broader scope of Jeffries’s analysis asks for more fact-finding, making
the fact-finding problem of Harlow worse. Second, in the context of
the Fourth Amendment, Jeffries’s solution worsens the problems of
double reasonableness.365 In a Fourth Amendment case, to decide
whether something was clearly unconstitutional, a court would have
to ask whether an officer’s conduct was clearly unreasonable.366 This
makes the qualified-immunity question even more like the constitutional question, since the court will be directly asking the
constitutional question as opposed to asking whether an officer made
a reasonable mistake about the law.367 Third, now that a court would
directly be asking a constitutional question under the clearly unconstitutional standard, this standard raises the typical standard at civil
trials. Instead of a preponderance of the evidence standard, courts
would be asking whether a right was clearly violated, which appears
similar to a clear and convincing evidence standard.368 These remain360. Malice could help create obviously outrageous conduct.
361. See supra Part II.A.2.
362. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
363. See supra Part II.A.2.
364. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (internal quotation
omitted).
365. See supra Part II.B.1.
366. See supra Part I.E.
367. See supra Part II.B.1.
368. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768–70 (1982) (discussing the clear
and convincing evidence standard).
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ing problems leave the scales of qualified immunity tipped heavily in
favor of the government.369
The three-factor proposal, on the other hand, has the same benefits as clearly unconstitutional without the drawbacks. Like Jeffries’s
standard, the three-factor proposal is not based on finding factually
similar precedent, it allows an examination of all the circumstances,
and it better protects the aims of Harlow. Unlike Jeffries’s proposal, it
does address inappropriate judicial fact finding. By changing the
terminology, courts will be able to interpret facts appropriately for the
stage of the proceeding. Also, unlike Jeffries’s proposal, the doublereasonableness problem is directly solved by the three-factor proposal.
Jeffries’s standard preserves the constitutional standards, which is
what creates many of qualified immunity’s problems. The three-factor
proposal, by eliminating the constitutional question, eliminates the
possibility for double reasonableness, and separates immunity from
constitutionality. Finally, the three-factor proposal—unlike Jeffries’s
proposal—does not raise the burden of proof for the constitutional
question to clear and convincing because the court no longer is asking
the constitutional question.
C.

Expanding the Definition of Clearly Established Law

Avidan Cover proposes a specific solution for qualified immunity
in the context of excessive-force claims: expanding the definition of
clearly established law to include “statutes, regulations, and department or agency policies applicable to the officer.”370 Cover’s proposition would not allow violations of use-of-force policies to “amount
to a per se constitutional violation,”371 but rather, “[t]he policy would
only inform the clearly established analysis.”372 This takes the analysis
out of the abstraction of comparing case law and grounds it in the
reality of police officers. It is more reasonable to expect officers “to be
familiar with their own department[’s] use of force policies than all
relevant or controlling circuit court opinions.”373 Cover states that it
helps remove the qualified-immunity analysis from the search for
specific fact patterns in precedent.374 He also states that this analysis

369. Jeffries acknowledges that this standard does not solve all of qualified
immunity’s problems, but is a “move in the right direction.” Jeffries,
supra note 78, at 264. I tend to agree.
370. Cover, supra note 113, at 1824.
371. Id. (emphasis added).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1825.
374. Id.
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creates at least the same fair notice envisioned in Harlow.375 Therefore,
the concerns of hardship on officers, embodied in Harlow, are not
undercut by this standard when it holds officers accountable to
standards with which they are more familiar.376
Cover’s solution addresses several of the problems with qualified
immunity for the Fourth Amendment specifically. Use-of-force policies
begin to address the problem of double reasonableness. The policies
will allow courts to move beyond abstractly figuring out whether a
reasonable mistake was made and how to differentiate the two levels
of reasonableness; the courts can now reference concrete policies and
hold the officer’s conduct to those policies. Instead of evaluating the
officer’s conduct through a double-reasonableness lens, the court can
compare the officer’s conduct to their use-of-force policies. It is also a
better standard for preventing over-deterrence of police conduct than
the Harlow standard.377 Police officers are most likely more familiar
with their department’s use-of-force policies than clearly established
law. Knowing that their liability will be judged by these more familiar
policies, officers would feel more confident in their actions. They
would feel more capable of acting, which is what the Harlow Court
wanted.378
Cover’s solution, like Jeffries’s, still does not fully address the
misbalanced scales of the Harlow standard. Like Jeffries’s standard,
Cover’s solution does not solve the inappropriate fact-finding in qualified immunity.379 It also creates a new issue: it may be possible for a
court to grant qualified immunity to an officer who follows a use-offorce policy, even if the use-of-force policy is unconstitutional. Cover
responds that this actually benefits society as a whole, because municipalities can still be held liable for the unconstitutional policy and
therefore be motivated to change them.380 While this certainly creates
benefits down the line, it still creates a problem in suits against
officers where unconstitutional conduct can go without a remedy
because of a systemic problem. Unless the plaintiff also sues the municipality, the systemic problem goes unaddressed. This does not
promote efficiency by dismissing claims quickly, as envisioned by
Harlow. Furthermore, a use-of-force policy could allow egregiously
unconstitutional behavior—the same kind that Jeffries wanted to
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See supra Part II.B.5.
378. See supra Part I.C.
379. See supra Parts II.A.2.
380. Cover, supra note 113, at 1836–37.
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capture381—and would then protect an officer’s egregiously
unconstitutional behavior.
The three-factor solution, on the other hand, does address the
misbalanced scales of the Harlow standard. It, similar to Cover’s
solution, will allow courts to look at police policies as a source of
reasonableness, but it goes beyond just clearly established to take
other factors into account. Cover’s solution does not address the
possibility of an officer’s subjective intent, but the three-factor
proposal weighs that evidence equally with other forms of reasonableness. Furthermore, the three-factor proposal can still find officers
liable for following an unconstitutional policy because it considers
more factors than just objective reasonableness. Overall, the threefactor proposal is a more complete solution than Cover’s proposition.

Conclusion
The Harlow balance is off. There are many reasons why—even
beyond those explored in this Note—but that conclusion is inescapable. Considering the thorough examination this Note gave to
the development of qualified immunity and the issues associated, the
impulse to simply abandon the doctrine is appealing. Abandoning the
doctrine might look like a Chen-like approach to immunity, or, as has
recently been posited, attacking the very legality of qualified immunity itself.382 Unfortunately, these arguments have not changed, and
most likely will not change, the minds of those who adhere to qualified immunity. The Justices have too deeply entrenched themselves
in the doctrine.
Instead, the best response is a compromise, which is what the
three-factor approach offers. The three-factor approach attempts to
correct the Harlow misbalance while still taking into account the
values the Justices value in qualified immunity. None of the factors
adds a new value to the analysis; it is built on the idea that the current Supreme Court will not change its mind on the existence of
qualified immunity, and the best strategy for justice is to accept the
terms of qualified immunity as provided and work from that point.
Of course, the three-factor approach aims to do the one thing the
Supreme Court has actively resisted: litigate more Fourth Amendment cases on their merits. The values the Supreme Court has
preached are valid, but they have been weighed incorrectly. Too much
deference has been given to government officials in the interest of
avoiding litigation. Because of this, too much unconstitutional con381. Jeffries, supra note 78, at 263–64.
382. See generally Baude, supra note 22 (discussing the legality of the doctrine
of qualified immunity).
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duct goes unchecked. In order to correct the misbalance, the solution
will necessarily result in more litigation. People like Jaime Lockard,
the Creightons, and Israel Leija, Jr.’s family should not have the
doors of justice closed on them before being heard. Their arguments
deserve more consideration than simply being compared to obscure
legal precedent. Hopefully, the three-factor approach can help open
these doors.
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